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In the early modern period, contempt emerged as a persistent theme in moral philosophy. Most of 
the moral philosophers of the period shared two basic commitments in their thinking about 
contempt. First, they argued that we understand the value of others in the morally appropriate way 
when we understand them from the perspective of the morally relevant community. And second, 
they argued that we are naturally inclined to judge others as contemptible, and that we must 
therefore interrupt that natural movement of sense-bestowal in order to value others in the morally 
appropriate way. In this paper I examine in detail the arguments of Nicolas Malebranche and 
Immanuel Kant concerning the wrongness of contempt, emphasizing the ways in which they depend 
on conceptions of community and of the interruption of moral sense-bestowal. After showing how 
each of these arguments fails to comprehend the nature and the wrongness of contempt, I argue that 
we can find the resources for a more adequate account in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and 
specifically in his reflections on ontology and on the meaning of community. 
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 In the early modern period, contempt emerged as a persistent theme in moral 
philosophy. Although none of the most important philosophers of the period examined the 
question of contempt at great length, and although none made it a central concern, almost 
all of them devoted at least a few pages to the issue, typically in the sections of their ethical 
treatises focusing on our duties toward others. And almost all agreed that treating others 
with contempt constituted a very serious moral wrong. Hobbes, for example, believed that 
“no one should show hatred or contempt of another by deeds, words, facial expressions, or 
laughter.”1 To do so, he argued, was to violate the natural law. In a similar vein, Christian 
Wolff argued that “since man ought not to make an enemy of anyone, he ought not to hold 
anyone in contempt.”2 Nicolas Malebranche characterized contempt as “the greatest of 
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injuries.”3 And Immanuel Kant insisted that expressing contempt is “in every case contrary 
to duty.”4  
Although early modern moral philosophers agreed that holding others in contempt 
was morally impermissible, they arrived at this conclusion on the basis of very different 
kinds of reasons. For Hobbes, as well as for Samuel Pufendorf and Pierre Nicole, contempt 
was understood primarily as a prudential wrong: contemning others causes interpersonal 
conflict and thus threatens the social order.5 For Malebranche, contempt was primarily an 
epistemic error: to contemn someone is to misjudge her true value. For Wolff, the duty we 
have not to contemn others derives from our duty to love others as we love ourselves, and 
thus to contribute to their perfection insofar as we are able.6 And for Kant, the wrongness of 
contempt derives from our duty to treat others with respect. Despite all these fundamental 
differences in argumentative strategy, though, moral philosophers of the early modern 
period did share two very basic commitments. First, they argued that we understand the 
value of others in the morally appropriate way when we understand them from the 
perspective of the morally relevant community. And second, they argued that we are 
naturally inclined to judge others as contemptible, and that we must therefore interrupt that 
natural movement of sense-bestowal in order to value others in the morally appropriate 
way. What I want to argue in this paper is that the early modern moral philosophers were 
correct to emphasize these two points, but that they tended to conceive each of them 
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inadequately, leading them both to mischaracterize what contempt is and to misidentify the 
wrong that it does to the person who is contemned. In what follows, then, I will examine in 
detail both Malebranche’s and Kant’s arguments concerning the wrongness of contempt, 
emphasizing the ways in which they depend on conceptions of community and of the 
interruption of moral sense-bestowal. After showing how each of these arguments fails to 
comprehend the nature and the wrongness of contempt, I will argue that we can find the 
resources for a more adequate account in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and specifically in 
his reflections on ontology and on the meaning of community. 
I. Seeing a Part of What God Thinks: Malebranche 
 The commitment that grounds Nicolas Malebranche’s account of the phenomenon 
of contempt, and indeed the whole of his moral philosophy, is stated in the very first 
sentence of his Traité de Morale: “The reason that enlightens man is the word or the 
wisdom of God himself; for every creature is a particular being, but the reason that 
enlightens the mind of man is universal.”7 Insofar as we are rational beings, then, we form a 
kind of community with God: we participate in his reason, and so are able to “see a part of 
what God thinks.”8 Qua particular being, I understand that my representations do not have 
the value of universal validity; if I burn my tongue drinking coffee that is too hot, the pain 
that results is mine and mine alone. If another person also drinks coffee that is too hot, her 
pain will be her own; we do not share the same pain. But if, on the other hand, I bring 
before my mind the concept of a triangle, I do understand my representation to have 
universal validity. When any other rational being at all, including the angels and God 
himself, conceives of a triangle, that being has exactly the same representation that I have. 
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In conceiving of a triangle, or indeed in thinking of anything that is objectively true, I see a 
part of what God thinks. To know, then, is to know what God knows. 
 The implication of our community with God that is most important from the moral 
point of view is that it enables us to will as God wills and to love as God loves. As a 
rational being, God wills only in accordance with a rational order. More specifically, God 
loves things in exact proportion to their objective worthiness to be loved. Now the 
worthiness of things to be loved is proportional to their degrees of perfection, which are 
known clearly and distinctly by God and somewhat less clearly and distinctly by us. What 
morality requires of us, then, is that we raise ourselves to God’s point of view, willing and 
loving as he does, in accordance with rational order. There ought to be a proportion in our 
degrees of love that corresponds exactly to the proportion in the degrees of perfection of the 
objects loved.9 We ought, for example to treat animals with greater esteem than inanimate 
things, for “an animal stands in a greater relation of perfection to a stone than a stone does 
to an animal.”10 We ought to treat human beings with greater esteem than animals, as 
human beings have an objectively greater degree of perfection, and of course we ought to 
esteem and love God the most.  
 This injunction to will as God wills and to love as God loves, in accordance with his 
objective knowledge of the degrees of perfection of things, entails that we must never treat 
other human beings with contempt. According to Malebranche, “man is the noblest of 
creatures, and so it is a false judgment and an unregulated movement to contemn him, 
whatever he may be.”11 Importantly, from God’s point of view, all human beings without 
exception merit esteem. We must not suppose that the poorest or lowest born are any less 
valuable than the wealthiest and highest born. Indeed, we must not even refuse our esteem 																																																								
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to the worst criminals and sinners; although their conduct should certainly be scorned, their 
persons are always worthy of respect. With the help of God, the worst of the worst can 
become “pure and holy like the angels” and can “precede us into the kingdom of God.”12 
Moreover, only God knows what is in people’s hearts. Perhaps a sinner has sinned by 
mistake, or perhaps he sinned freely but has since repented. None of us can know these 
things, and so none of us has a right to deny to anyone the esteem that is due to all human 
beings. 
 Of course it is very difficult for us to determine the moral sense of the situations we 
face from the point of view of our community with God. This is primarily because we 
orient ourselves toward the world not only rationally, but also sensibly. Insofar as we 
encounter the world by means of the senses, our experience tends to be particular and thus 
distorted by self-love. Interpreting events against the backdrop of our own desires, 
aversions, and prejudices, we overestimate the value of persons or things that make us 
happy and we exaggerate the severity of the wrongs done to us by our supposed enemies. 
The greatest sinner, who in the eyes of God is a potential saint, is for us a source of danger. 
The least of us, who in the eyes of God are potentially first, appear to us rather as victims of 
their own laziness or stupidity and as making unjust appeals for our sympathy and support. 
Judging in a way that is systematically distorted by our passions, we all have a tendency to 
underestimate the value of others, even to the point of contempt. In order to avoid inflicting 
this “greatest of injuries” on others, it is essential that we develop what Malebranche calls 
freedom of the mind, or the capacity to suspend our consent to the evaluations we are 
naturally inclined to make concerning others’ value: “When we judge because we want to 
do so, and before we are obliged by the evidence to do so, we are subject to error; this is 
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because the judgment comes from a basis in us and not from the action of God in us.”13 The 
suspension of our natural, self-regarding moral sense-bestowal helps to raise us to the level 
of community with God, where the objective values of things and of other persons become 
evident. 
 On Malebranche’s account, then, to judge someone as contemptible is to make an 
epistemic error; the wrongness of contempt consists in the falseness of the judgment. The 
contemned person has an objective value that is grounded in the objective degree of 
perfection in human beings generally. Because we tend to evaluate persons from our own 
particular points of view, though, we fail to recognize that value. And in failing to 
recognize others’ objectively true values, we wrong them. 
 I want to argue that this account of contempt is mistaken, that we cannot understand 
the wrongness of contempt in terms of the falseness of a judgment of value. To show why 
this is the case, I will examine one of Malebranche’s own examples. In support of his claim 
that we ought not to contemn the poor and the low born, Malebranche notes that “the least 
of men can be elevated to sovereign power, and the first kings that God gave to the 
Israelites were drawn, so to speak, from the dregs of the people. Saul, from the lowliest 
family within the smallest of the twelve tribes, found royalty when he was searching for his 
father’s donkeys.”14 Now suppose someone had told Saul, prior to his being chosen as king, 
that he was a worthless nobody who represented the dregs of his people. Clearly the person 
would have treated Saul with contempt in speaking to him in this way. But in what 
precisely would the contempt have consisted? Would the speaker have contemned Saul, as 
Malebranche’s account would suggest, simply by judging his value incorrectly, on the basis 
of his own particular, self-serving point of view? To discover the answer to this last 																																																								
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question, we need only imagine the conversation that might follow the speaker’s expression 
of contempt. Saul might very well say to his contemnor, “Even though nothing in my life 
has suggested it so far, I may one day, by the grace of God, rise to a position of great 
authority. And so you did me a great wrong in speaking to me with contempt.” In one 
sense, of course, Saul’s response would be correct: he did in fact possess a value that the 
contemnor failed to recognize. But in another, more important sense, Saul’s response would 
have missed the mark. The wrong done to Saul surely does not consist in the mere lack of 
correspondence between his objective value and the contemnor’s judgment about that 
value. Let us suppose that God had not in fact granted to Saul the potential to rise above his 
circumstances, or to do anything at all that would make him worthy of admiration or 
respect. Even in that case, surely the contemnor ought not to have told Saul that he was a 
worthless nobody. The contemnor, in our example, would have wronged Saul whether or 
not his judgment of Saul’s value had turned out to be true. The wrongness of contempt, 
then, cannot consist simply in the falseness of the judgment in which it is expressed. 
 Malebranche, I believe, was certainly correct to argue that we can wrong others by 
making and by acting upon mistaken judgments of their value. But he was incorrect in 
treating such mistaken judgments as instances of contempt. For example, if I assigned too 
low a final grade to a student simply because I had forgotten to record one of her homework 
grades in my grade book, then it would certainly be appropriate to say that I wronged the 
student. But it would be odd to suggest that I contemned her. And this is just because 
contempt is not primarily a matter of true or false judgments about persons and their value. 
Instead, as I will attempt to demonstrate in what follows, it is better understood as a 
particular manner of comporting oneself to the person. It is, in Stephen Darwall’s terms, an 
irreducibly second-personal phenomenon. 
II. The Right as Prior to the Good: Kant 
 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant gives an account of contempt that 
highlights its independence from questions of truth and falsity and that intimates its second-
personal character. In Section 39 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant asserts that  “to be 
contemptuous of others (contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to human 
beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty.”15 In this he agrees with Malebranche. 
But unlike Malebranche, Kant does not ground the duty not to contemn on any knowledge 
of persons’ true value. His argument does not rely on the possibility that people have good 
qualities that, because of the finitude of our intellects, we have failed to recognize. Even if 
we could somehow judge with certainty that a person completely lacked moral worth, Kant 
believes we would be obligated not to treat the person with contempt: we owe the person 
respect “even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.”16 
 In passages scattered throughout his various ethical works, Kant states that certain 
persons are objectively contemptible.17 In the Lectures on Ethics, for example, Kant argues 
that we dispose of our humanity, and thus render ourselves contemptible, when we sell 
parts of our own bodies or allow ourselves to be used for the sexual pleasure of others. In 
performing such acts, we renounce our own subjectivity, reducing ourselves to the level of 
mere things.18 In practicing other vices, such as drunkenness and gluttony, we render 
ourselves contemptible by reducing ourselves to the level of the non-rational animals.19 And 
in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant argues that the vices of lying, avarice, and servility are 																																																								
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contrary to inner freedom and human dignity; to adopt them is to “throw oneself away and 
make oneself an object of contempt.”20 Now as rational beings, we all belong to a common 
moral community. Our practical reason has the principle of morality “always before its eyes 
and uses [it] as the norm for its appraisals.” As a result, we all know “very well how to 
distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity 
with duty or contrary to duty….”21 No member of the rational moral community can fail to 
recognize the drunkard or the glutton as contemptible, just as no rational person can fail to 
think of an observed event as having a cause. This common recognition of certain persons 
as worthy of contempt is not, for Kant, a merely contingent feature of our psychological 
makeup; the reason that presents the drunkard and the glutton as contemptible is legislative 
in the practical domain. Those who dispose of their humanity, reducing themselves to the 
level of non-human animals or even of mere things, are objectively worthy of contempt. 
 To comply with the duty not to contemn, then, we must interrupt the moral sense 
that we bestow simply in virtue of our being rational, self-legislating members of the moral 
community: “At times one cannot, it is true, help inwardly looking down on some in 
comparison with others (despicatui habere); but the outward manifestation of this is, 
nevertheless, an offense.”22 The difference between Kant’s and Malebranche’s positions on 
this point is remarkable. According to Malebranche, we must interrupt our sensibly based, 
self-regarding moral sense-bestowal in order to raise ourselves to the level of the true moral 
community, where the objective value of human beings as the noblest of all God’s creatures 
becomes plainly visible. For Kant, on the other hand, it is the sense-bestowal of the moral 
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community itself that we must interrupt: even though the liar or the drunkard truly is 
contemptible from the perspective of legislative pure practical reason, we must nonetheless 
refrain from treating him contemptuously. This Kantian way of presenting the relation 
between contempt, community, and the interruption of moral sense-bestowal avoids the 
problems that arise from treating contempt as an epistemic error. But it also raises a new 
and difficult question: if another person truly is contemptible, then what can ground our 
duty to treat him as if he were not? How can it be the case that reason prohibits us from 
acting on the basis of moral determinations that have their source in that very same reason? 
 One promising way of understanding Kant’s prohibition on contempt is to see it as 
grounded not in facts about a person’s properties, but rather in facts about the relations that 
obtain between persons. More specifically, we might understand the wrongness of contempt 
as following from the presuppositions of what Stephen Darwall has called the second-
person standpoint. To stand in a second-personal relation with another is to acknowledge 
that person as having the authority to address agent-relative demands. If I accidentally step 
on another person’s foot, for example, that person has a right to demand that I pick up my 
foot and that I put it down elsewhere. Because I stand in a second-personal relation with 
him, his very act of making the demand counts for me as a morally relevant consideration; I 
am accountable specifically to him. He does not need to convince me to move my foot by 
making reference to reasons that I might have completely independent of my second-
personal relation with him, such as my general utilitarian commitment to maximizing the 
total amount of happiness in the world.23 Contempt, on this kind of account, would consist 
in the refusal of second-personal relation, that is, in the refusal to treat the other person as 
having the authority to address demands to which one would be answerable.  																																																								
23 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 5-8. Hereafter SPS. 
 The two examples of contempt that Kant gives in Section 39 of the Doctrine of 
Virtue seem to support the second-personal interpretation. First, we treat people with 
contempt when we subject them to “disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself 
(such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears).”24 In her 
paper, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” Michelle Mason suggests that for Kant, the 
wrongness of contempt consists in the fact that it can motivate people to perform such 
gruesome acts.25 But the text does not seem to support that reading. To subject persons to 
degrading punishments is to contemn them; it is not merely a consequence of having 
contemned them. To torture a person is to treat him third-personally, as nothing more than a 
case falling under the law. The torturer does not recognize claims addressed to him by the 
victim as providing him with any morally relevant reasons to limit the extent of his cruelty. 
The victim is treated as a moral nobody. It is that refusal of the second-personal relation 
that constitutes the wrongness of the act of contempt. This is illustrated perhaps more 
clearly in the second of Kant’s examples: we treat a person with contempt when we censure 
his errors too severely, “calling them absurdities, poor judgment and so forth.”26 In using 
such disrespectful language, the contemnor indicates that he regards the contemned as so 
lacking in reason as to be unable even to present an argument for his views. He cuts off the 
possibility of entering into any kind of genuine dialogue that could result in his being won 
over to the other’s point of view. Once again, he treats the contemned person third-
personally, merely as the object of his judgment. Whether or not the person’s error was 
truly an absurdity, or even an error at all, is beside the point; even if the person reasoned 
extraordinarily badly in committing the error, we would do him a serious moral wrong by 
refusing to engage with him second personally. 																																																								
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 But this second-personal account of the wrongness of contempt seems merely to 
push back a step the question that Malebranche’s account had failed adequately to answer: 
why, precisely, is it wrong to treat others with contempt? Why are we obligated to maintain 
second-personal relations with others? Kant provides a possible answer in Section 11 of the 
Doctrine of Virtue when he writes that each person “possesses a dignity (an absolute inner 
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.”27 
It is the word “exacts” (abnötigen) that I want to emphasize here. Kant seems to be arguing 
that we encounter the other person as wresting respect from us, whether we like it or not. 
This wresting of respect from us does not depend on our having first recognized the other as 
having certain properties that entitle him to the respect; it is wrested from us simply in 
virtue of our standing in relation to him. In the exacting of respect, then, the constraint of 
the obligation not to contemn happens to the moral subject.28  
 Although this account would certainly contribute to our understanding of the 
grounds of the prohibition on treating others with contempt, it is ultimately untenable as an 
interpretation of Kant’s own position. One of the most basic and distinctive commitments 
of Kantian ethics is the idea that the right is prior to the good. Kant expresses this point 
most straightforwardly in the Critique of Practical Reason when he writes that it is “the 
moral law that first determines and makes possible the concept of the good, insofar as it 
deserves this name absolutely.”29 Kant’s concern in establishing the priority of the right 
over the good is to account for the possibility of goods that are specifically moral, and not 
merely prudential. But the priority of the right also rules out the possibility that the moral 
law could be grounded in any kind of good at all, including what Kant calls the 																																																								
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incomparable worth of dignity: “For, nothing can have a worth other than that which the 
law determines for it.”30 As Oliver Sensen has convincingly argued, worth is not a distinct 
metaphysical property for Kant, and so it cannot exact respect from anyone.31 Thus it is not 
the case, as suggested above, that the constraint of the obligation not to contemn is 
something that happens to the moral subject. As Kant argues explicitly in the Groundwork, 
such a conception is incompatible with autonomy, i.e., with the supreme principle of 
morality: “If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness 
of its maxims for its own giving of universal law—consequently if, in going beyond itself, 
it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects—heteronomy always results.”32 In 
refraining from holding others in contempt, then, we obey only a law that we give to 
ourselves. 
 But this account of the wrongness of contempt gives rise to problems very similar to 
the ones we noted in Malebranche’s account. Contempt, as I argued above, seems to be 
most fundamentally a second-personal phenomenon; the wrong that we do in holding others 
in contempt is a wrong we do to the contemned. For Kant, though, the wrong consists 
ultimately in our failure to act autonomously; the contemned is merely the occasion of the 
wrong. And what is more, the object of the respect that the moral law commands is the 
other qua rational nature. It is this, Kant thinks, that elevates human beings above the rest of 
nature and thus functions as the source of their dignity.33 But this too seems to miss 
something essential in the phenomenology of contempt, something that is especially visible 
from the point of the view of the one who is contemned. When I am treated with contempt, 
I do not feel as if it is I qua possessor of any particular property, or even I qua possessor of 
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the totality of my properties, who has been mistreated. It is not I qua human being for 
example, or qua scholarly authority, or qua benefactor, but rather I as this absolutely 
singular being. This is not to deny, of course, that general properties can function as the 
occasions for contempt. But the target of the contempt, the one who bears the weight of it 
and who is wronged by it, is the person as singular. An adequate account of contempt 
should be able to make sense of this, along with its irreducibly relational character as a 
mode of address to another. 
III. Sense and Singularity: Nancy 
In this final section, I want to argue that the work of Jean-Luc Nancy provides us 
with the resources for a more adequate account of contempt. Relying primarily on the 
ontology that Nancy develops in a number of different texts, but most explicitly in Being 
Singular Plural and The Sense of the World, I will argue first that community happens 
precisely as the interruption of sense, and second that this interruption presents others to us 
as singular and as sources of a legitimate demand not to treat them with contempt. This 
Nancian account of contempt will provide support for Kant’s claim, expressed in the 
Doctrine of Virtue, that the other possesses a kind of value by which he “exacts respect for 
himself.” While this claim turned out to be incompatible with some of the most 
fundamental commitments of Kantian ethics, it can be shown to follow straightforwardly 
from Nancy’s ontology of being-with.34 
																																																								
34 I would like briefly to address the apparent incongruity involved in bringing the work of Jean-Luc Nancy to 
bear on Malebranche’s and Kant’s accounts of the relations between contempt and community. To the best of 
my knowledge, Nancy has never situated his own work within the body of early modern literature on 
contempt. And when he writes about community, he is not primarily concerned with the kind of rational 
community that both Malebranche and Kant had in mind. Nancy’s reflection is historically situated, 
responding to the challenges to our sense of community that were effected by the perceived failures of an 
increasingly totalitarian communism and a highly individualistic, liberal capitalism. What I would like to 
suggest is that the felt loss of given, practically orienting sense, which was associated with the perceived 
failures of these two models of being-together, brings into sharper relief the experience of singularity that is 
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In outlining the ontology that will ground a Nancian understanding of contempt, I 
would like to begin with Nancy’s conception of aseity. The primary sense of aseity comes 
from Scholastic philosophy, where it refers to God’s property of having his existence from 
himself, or independently of all other beings. (The term is derived from the Latin a se, from 
itself.) But Nancy takes advantage of the meaning of the French à—to or toward—to give 
the term a completely different sense. To be, on Nancy’s account, is necessarily to be à soi, 
or toward oneself. The à signifies a distancing or a spacing from oneself that is the 
condition of possibility for one’s being present as oneself. In Corpus, Nancy writes that 
“aseity—the a se(lf), the to-itself, the by-itself of the Subject—exists only as the swerve and 
departure of this a—(of this a-part-self), which is the place, the moment proper of its 
presence, its authenticity, its sense.”35 It is not the case, on Nancy’s view, that first there are 
beings, and then in addition the to or the spacing that allows them to appear as the beings 
they are. The aseity or being-to of beings is ontologically basic. 
To unpack what this means, I will begin with a claim that Nancy advances in his 
Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative: “the given always gives itself as something other 
than simply given.”36 That is to say, it never happens in our experience that we are 
confronted with brute, unqualified being; whatever becomes manifest to us becomes 
manifest to us as something. The machine that I am using to type these words, for example, 
is present to me as a computer. As I type, I am present to myself as a professional 
philosopher. And at a higher level of abstraction, whenever I think about questions in 
ontology I find that being is manifest to me as being. The “as” in these constructions 
signifies the presence of sense: the machine I am using to type these words has the meaning 																																																								
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 33. 
36 Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and  
Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 52. Hereafter H. Italics omitted.	
	
of “computer” and I have the meaning of “professional philosopher.” Thus, we can gloss 
Nancy’s claim as follows: the given always gives itself as meaningful. But we must not 
understand this to mean that there are two things—the given being and meaning—that are 
merely juxtaposed. It is not the case, for example, that I have two discrete objects of 
consciousness as I type: the given, sensuously present thing and the meaning “computer.” 
As Nancy puts it in The Sense of the World, “sense does not add itself to being…[or] 
supervene upon being.”37 Rather, the being is manifest as meaningful, and the meaning is 
manifest as the meaning of the being.38 This happens as one phenomenon, and not as two. 
Thus “being is the sense of the being, or rather—and because there is not the being on one 
side and its sense on the other—being is the structure, property, and sense-event of the 
being in general.”39 
The happening of being as the sense-event of the being in general presupposes a to 
that is irreducible. Sense, Nancy argues, begins with a presence that is necessarily a divided 
presence, a presence of something to something.40 A being, in other words, is never 
immediately one with its sense. It has its sense, rather, only as exposed, as present to other 
beings. Hegel’s treatment of sense certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit provides a good 
example of Nancy’s point. Thisness is not immanent or immediately present to the given 
being whose sense is “this;” thisness only appears in the presence of the this to a 
consciousness. In being-this, then, the being is necessarily exposed to an outside. The to 
here names the spacing that first gives the being to be given as meaningful, as this. It is not 
the case, in other words, that there would first be a being which is in itself a this, and 
																																																								
37 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 28. Hereafter SW. 
38 Nancy, H, 49. 
39 Nancy, SW, 13. Translation modified. 
40 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 2. 
secondly another being who would come upon the scene and recognize it as such. The 
sense-event of the being happens only at the limit where it is exposed to its outside. If we 
try to imagine the sense of the being without its aseity, as a “pure unshared presence—
presence to nothing, of nothing, for nothing,” then what we are left with is neither a 
presence nor an absence, but rather the “simple implosion of a being that could never have 
been—an implosion without any trace.”41 We would be left, in other words, with a kind of 
black hole of meaning. The to is necessary as the place, the moment proper of the being’s 
presence and of its sense.  
The name that Nancy gives to this spacing, to the exposition by which we become 
present most originarily to each other in our sense, is community.42 The conception of 
community that Nancy articulates is importantly different from the conceptions we find in 
Malebranche and Kant. For both of the latter, the commonness that grounds community is 
an established common sense that unites all of the members. In Malebranche, the moral 
community has its basis in our rational nature, in our ability to think what God thinks and to 
value things as God values them. In Kant, the moral community is constituted by legislative 
pure practical reason, which is common to all rational beings. Nancy, on the other hand, 
insists that community “is nothing common.”43 Instead, community names the space that is 
opened by the to of our presence to each other, a space not of shared sense but rather of the 
sense-event of the beings who make it up. In this sense-event, meaning happens as 
ceaselessly interrupted.44 As beings who are constitutively exposed to each other, the 
members’ identities are improper and inappropriable; the sense that comes into being in the 																																																								
41 Ibid. 
42 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991), 19; 26. Hereafter IC. 
43 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common” in Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 5. Hereafter OBC. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to 
Presence, trans. Brian Holmes and Others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 155. Hereafter BP. 
44 Nancy, OBC, 6. 
to of their presence to each other is excessive to any significations that they can think of as 
their own. Precisely what is shared in community is the non-identity of each member to 
herself and to the others.45 Indeed, community, for Nancy, just is being’s never being 
immediately one with its sense.46 
In the interruption of sense that happens in our exposition to each other in 
community, we become present to each other as singularities. A singular, in Nancy’s sense 
of the term, is importantly different from a particular, which is an instance of a kind. Qua 
particular, a being is identified with its sense, and is thus differentiated from other 
particulars merely numerically.47 Qua particular, for example, a person instantiates a whole 
set of significations concerning race, class, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, 
profession, etc. But the sense-event of that person’s being exceeds each of these 
significations and it exceeds all of them together. The person is not only the instantiation of 
a set of significations, but also the very site of the happening of sense. This site is 
“incomparable and inassimilable, not because it is simply ‘other’ but because it is an origin 
and touch of meaning.”48 As such sites of origin, where established, proper significations 
are ceaselessly interrupted, each of us is absolutely singular and unexchangeable.  
The singular that is given in the spacing of being-to is given as exacting respect. 
Respect, as Nancy understands it, “is the very alteration of the position and structure of the 
subject.”49 At the level of being-to, the structure of subjectivity—of the relation to an object 
that is intended as a unity of sense correlative to a subjective act of sense-bestowal—is 
interrupted. In community, the subject is positioned outside itself, exposed at its limit to an 
upsurge of a sense that is not its own and that it cannot appropriate. The singular, 																																																								
45 Nancy, IC, 66. 
46 Nancy, OBC, 8. 
47 Nancy, BSP, 32. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
49 Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking, ed. Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 147. 
incommensurable sense that arises in the subject’s exposure to the other does not have its 
origin, then, in the autonomous Kantian subject who would intend the other, in accordance 
with its own measure, as having a value that merits respect. Understood in terms of Nancy’s 
ontology of aseity, respect is not a mode of intentionality, of looking at an object, but rather 
a kind of looking back (re-spicere) toward the sense-event that first gives the subject and 
the meaningful world in which it has its being.50 In respect, therefore, the subject is 
presented to itself as the addressee, and not as the addressor, of the sense of the other. 
Because being-to is ontologically irreducible, the subject can never convert itself without 
remainder to the position of autonomous addressor of moral sense; the subject is always 
most fundamentally the recipient of its meaningful being. The sense that is in play in the 
encounter with the other, then, is a sense that befalls the subject always already, weighing 
on it and making a claim on it. And so there is no need to present an argument showing that 
other persons deserve our respect, and thus deserve not to be contemned; to encounter the 
singular as singular just is to have respect exacted from us. 
I want to conclude by showing how Nancy’s ontology helps us better to understand 
both what it is to contemn another person and what the wrongness of doing so consists in. 
First, Nancy’s ontology helps to make sense of our intuition that contempt is second 
personal through and through. We miss something essential about contempt when we 
understand it as a false belief about another or as a failure to act autonomously with regard 
to another. Contempt, rather, is a mode of relating immediately to another. It is not a 
subjective position, but an intersubjective one. Contempt, on the Nancian account I am 
suggesting, consists more specifically in the refusal of being-to, a refusal of openness to 
others as singularities and thus as incommensurable and unexchangeable origins of the 
world. Stated otherwise, it is a refusal of the addressee position that is ineluctably ours and 																																																								
50 Nancy, BP, 44-45. 
that is made manifest to us in the experience of respect. This account, I want to suggest, 
makes better sense of the examples of contempt from Section 39 of the Doctrine of Virtue 
than Kant’s own account does. I will focus here specifically on Kant’s second example. 
When we criticize another’s errors too severely, “calling them absurdities, poor judgment 
and so forth,” we attempt to engage with that person wholly from the addressor position, 
determining the sense of his point of view unilaterally and without appeal. We relate to the 
other in such a way as to foreclose the possibility that any new and unforeseen sense will 
originate from the encounter; whatever valuable sense comes from the encounter will come 
from the side of the contemnor. The contempt here consists neither in the judgment, 
presumably false but perhaps even true, of the other’s intellectual capacities, nor in the 
failure to act with regard to the contemned as our own legislative practical reason 
commands. The contempt consists rather in a mode of being-to that attempts to neutralize 
the sense-event of the other’s being. As the attempt to render the being of the other 
immediately identical with his sense, contempt consists precisely in the refusal of 
community. 
And finally, the Nancian account that I am suggesting provides a more adequate 
account of the specific wrongness of contempt. Malebranche, as we saw, thought of 
contempt as “the greatest of injuries.” The other moral philosophers of the early modern 
period did not express themselves quite so strongly, but they all believed that contemning 
others constituted a serious wrong. However none of these theories succeeded in explaining 
precisely why contempt is so bad. This is especially clear in the accounts of Hobbes, 
Pufendorf, and Nicole, which treat the wrongness of contempt as prudential. But it is also a 
problem for Malebranche’s account: it is not obvious at all how a person is grievously 
wronged merely by others’ holding false beliefs about her value. Kant’s account also falls 
short of explaining the wrong: if a person possesses an incomparable worth, set above all 
price, merely in virtue of her rational nature, then how precisely is she wronged by others 
who do not treat her accordingly? Her value as a human being, it seems, is a secure 
possession that no one else could ever deprive her of. I want to argue that the Nancian 
account succeeds where the Kantian account fails because it is able to explain how the 
contemned is vulnerable to the wrong. The incommensurable value that a being has as a 
singular origin of the world is not in fact a secure possession. As we have seen, that value is 
unavoidably exposed, arising only between beings who are oriented to each other in 
community. The person’s status as somebody who matters, as what John Rawls called a 
self-originating source of valid claims, is at stake in her second-personal relations with 
others, vulnerable to those who would engage with her as someone who does not matter.51 
To refuse to relate to someone as “an origin and touch of meaning,” then, is to wrong the 
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